Board Dynamics : A Structural Investigation
Research output: Conference Papers (RGC: 31A, 31B, 32, 33) › 32_Refereed conference paper (no ISBN/ISSN) › peer-review
Related Research Unit(s)
|Publication status||Published - Oct 2014|
|Title||2014 Financial Management Association Annual Meeting|
|Period||15 - 18 October 2014|
This paper examines how CEO characteristics affect board structure through structural estimation. I find a negative relation between board independence and CEO ability. This relation is strong when CEO ability is low, but it is weak on average. Further, when I restrict CEO ability to be the only CEO characteristic that can cause variation in board independence, the standard deviation of board independence in the simulated sample is less than 50% of its empirical counterpart. These results explain the reasons for the insignificant relation between board independence and CEO ability within a regression framework.