Lawsuit Outcomes and the Deep Pockets of Big Four audit firms
Research output: Conference Papers (RGC: 31A, 31B, 32, 33) › 31A_Invited conference paper (refereed items) › Yes › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Publication status | Published - 30 Nov 2017 |
Conference
Title | 2017 Accounting Theory and Practice Conference & 2017 Asian Accounting Associations Conference |
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Location | Chinese Culture University |
Place | Taiwan |
City | Taipei |
Period | 30 November - 1 December 2017 |
Link(s)
Permanent Link | https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/publications/publication(33eda315-3da8-4b01-8924-eb3be56b0698).html |
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Abstract
It is often argued
that Big Four firms have deep pockets, which provide substantial compensation
to investors in the event of litigation. However, prior litigation research
fails to find consistent evidence supporting the deep pockets argument.
Different from prior research, we separately model both the dollar size
of the payout to the plaintiff and the probability of a payout. We
predict that, in a deep pockets action, the dollar size of the payout is
relatively large whereas the payout probability is relatively small. Consistent
with these predictions, we find that payouts are significantly larger when Big
Four firms are sued but the payout probabilities are significantly smaller. We
conclude that deep pockets lawsuits have lottery-like characteristics, in the
sense that the dollar payouts are large but the payout probabilities are small.
Research Area(s)
- Accounting lawsuits, lawsuit outcomes, deep pockets
Bibliographic Note
Research Unit(s) information for this publication is provided by the author(s) concerned.
Citation Format(s)
Lawsuit Outcomes and the Deep Pockets of Big Four audit firms. / Lennox, Clive; LI, Bing.
2017. 2017 Accounting Theory and Practice Conference & 2017 Asian Accounting Associations Conference, Taipei, Taiwan.Research output: Conference Papers (RGC: 31A, 31B, 32, 33) › 31A_Invited conference paper (refereed items) › Yes › peer-review