Channel coordination with a risk-neutral supplier and a downside-risk-averse retailer
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 80-89 |
| Journal / Publication | Production and Operations Management |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2005 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
We investigate how a supply chain involving a risk-neutral supplier and a downside-risk-averse retailer can be coordinated with a supply contract. We show that the standard buy-back or revenue-sharing contracts may not coordinate such a channel. Using a definition of coordination of supply chains proposed earlier by the authors, we design a risk-sharing contract that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides respective reservation profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination. © 2005 Production and Operations Management Society.
Research Area(s)
- Coordination, Downside risk, Risk sharing, Supply chain management, Value at risk
Citation Format(s)
Channel coordination with a risk-neutral supplier and a downside-risk-averse retailer. / Gan, Xianghua; Sethi, Suresh P.; Yan, Houmin.
In: Production and Operations Management, Vol. 14, No. 1, 03.2005, p. 80-89.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
