Campaign-style enforcement and regulatory compliance
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
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Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 85-95 |
Journal / Publication | Public Administration Review |
Volume | 75 |
Issue number | 1 |
Online published | 14 Oct 2014 |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2015 |
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Abstract
This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign-style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign-style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two-pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five-Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign-style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign-style enforcement.
Citation Format(s)
Campaign-style enforcement and regulatory compliance. / Liu, Nicole Ning; Lo, Carlos Wing-Hung; Zhan, Xueyong; Wang, Wei.
In: Public Administration Review, Vol. 75, No. 1, 01.2015, p. 85-95.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review