What drives the cash dividend policy of the poorly performing firms in Hong Kong?

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

6 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

  • Louis T.W. Cheng
  • Hung-Gay Fung
  • T. Y. Leung

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)347-361
Journal / PublicationReview of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies
Volume11
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Abstract

We use financial data on poorly performing firms in Hong Kong to examine the motives behind paying out cash dividends when they suffer an earnings decline. We test three hypotheses behind the cash dividend policy: the maturity hypothesis, the free cash flow hypothesis, and the self-interest hypothesis of directors (i.e., the cash channeling hypothesis of directors). The findings are largely consistent with the maturity hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis but do not support the cash channeling hypothesis, confirming good market transparency and governance of the Hong Kong market. © 2008 World Scientific Publishing Co. and Center for Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance Research.

Research Area(s)

  • Cash dividends, Corporate governance, Maturity, Poor earnings

Citation Format(s)

What drives the cash dividend policy of the poorly performing firms in Hong Kong? / Cheng, Louis T.W.; Fung, Hung-Gay; Leung, T. Y.

In: Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2008, p. 347-361.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review