Properties of symmetric incentive compatible auctions

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review

3 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

  • Xiaotie Deng
  • Kazuo Iwama
  • Qi Qi
  • Aries Wei SUN
  • Toyotaka Tasaka

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputing and Combinatorics
Subtitle of host publication13th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2007, Banff, Canada, July 16-19, 2007, Proceedings
EditorsGuohui Lin
Pages264-273
Number of pages10
VolumeLNCS 4598
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
VolumeLNCS 4598
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Conference

Title13th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2007)
PlaceCanada
CityBanff
Period16 - 19 July 2007

Abstract

We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number of sales.

Citation Format(s)

Properties of symmetric incentive compatible auctions. / Deng, Xiaotie; Iwama, Kazuo; Qi, Qi et al.
Computing and Combinatorics: 13th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2007, Banff, Canada, July 16-19, 2007, Proceedings. ed. / Guohui Lin. Vol. LNCS 4598 2007. p. 264-273 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. LNCS 4598 ).

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review