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Privacy-Preserving Gradient Descent for Distributed Genome-Wide Analysis

  • Yanjun Zhang
  • , Guangdong Bai*
  • , Xue Li
  • , Caitlin Curtis
  • , Chen Chen
  • , Ryan K. L. Ko
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review

Abstract

Genome-wide analysis, which provides perceptive insights into complex diseases, plays an important role in biomedical data analytics. It usually involves large-scale human genomic data, and thus may disclose sensitive information about individuals. While existing studies have been conducted against data exfiltration by external malicious actors, this work focuses on the emerging identity tracing attack that occurs when a dishonest insider attempts to re-identify obtained DNA samples. We propose a framework named υFRAG to facilitate privacy-preserving data sharing and computation in genome-wide analysis. υFRAG mitigates privacy risks by using vertical fragmentations to disrupt the genetic architecture on which the adversary relies for re-identification. The fragmentation significantly reduces the overall amount of information the adversary can obtain. Notably, it introduces no sacrifice to the capability of genome-wide analysis—we prove that it preserves the correctness of gradient descent, the most popular optimization approach for training machine learning models. We also explore the efficiency performance of υFRAG through experiments on a large-scale, real-world dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that υFRAG outperforms not only secure multiparty computation (MPC) and homomorphic encryption (HE) protocols with a speedup of more than 221x for training neural networks, but also noise-based differential privacy (DP) solutions and traditional non-private algorithms in most settings. © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationComputer Security – ESORICS 2021 - 26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Proceedings, Part II
EditorsElisa Bertino, Haya Shulman, Michael Waidner
PublisherSpringer, Cham
Pages395-416
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9783030884284
ISBN (Print)9783030884277
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Externally publishedYes
Event26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2021) - Virtual
Duration: 4 Oct 20218 Oct 2021
https://esorics2021.athene-center.de/

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume12973
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2021)
Period4/10/218/10/21
Internet address

Funding

This work is partly supported by the University of Queensland under the UQ Cyber Initiative Strategic Research Seed Funding 4018264-01-299-21-618071.

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