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Poster: Metadata-private Messaging without Coordination

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review

Abstract

Metadata-private messaging (MPM) refers to an end-to-end encrypted messaging system that protects not just the payload messages but also the privacy-revealing communication metadata, such as user identities, conversation frequencies, traffic volumes, etc. Protecting the communication metadata is challenging due to the existence of global adversaries that can monitor and even actively interfere with the traffic. Established systems like Tor are not adequate under such adversarial models. Thus, many academic systems have been proposed to push this frontier with different trade-offs among security, performance, and trust assumptions. Despite progress, one major limitation prevalent in almost all prior art is the requirement for messaging buddies to coordinate the time (also known as “dialing”) to start the conversation. Compared to traditional messaging systems, such coordination protocols, which must also be metadata private, are expensive for both user adoption and service operations. In this ongoing study, we propose to develop a new MPM system without coordination. Unlike prior art, we plan to model the MPM system into two separate modules: metadata-private notifications and metadata-private message retrieval, which is intuitively inspired by traditional messaging systems. We will instantiate these ideas by drawing insights from recent work about private signaling, oblivious message retrieval, and MPM under hardware trust. © 2023 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS '23 - Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Place of PublicationNew York, NY
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages3615-3617
ISBN (Print)9798400700507
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Event30th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2023) - Tivoli Congress Center, Copenhagen, Denmark
Duration: 26 Nov 202330 Nov 2023
https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2023/index.html

Publication series

NameCCS - Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Conference

Conference30th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2023)
Abbreviated titleCCS 2023
PlaceDenmark
CityCopenhagen
Period26/11/2330/11/23
Internet address

Funding

This work was supported in part by the HK RGC under Grants RFS2122-1S04 and C1029-22G, and by InnoHK initiative on the Laboratory for AI-Powered Financial Technologies.

Research Keywords

  • anonymity
  • anonymous communication
  • metadata privacy

RGC Funding Information

  • RGC-funded

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