Political connection of financial intermediaries: Evidence from China's IPO market

Donghua Chen, Yuyan Guan, Tianyu Zhang, Gang Zhao*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

110 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from 2006 to 2011, we document that politically connected (PC) underwriters increase the likelihood of clients’ IPO applications being approved by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We further show that PC underwriters charge premium underwriting fees. Consistent with the rent-seeking argument, we find that minority shareholders’ interests may be impaired as indicated by post-IPO underperformance. We do not detect significant differences in the underpricing of IPO deals underwritten by PC versus non-PC investment banks.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-31
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Volume76
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2017

Research Keywords

  • IPO
  • Political connection
  • Post-IPO underperformance
  • Underpricing
  • Underwriters

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