Partners or Rivals? An Experimental Study of a Two-Stage Tournament

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

1 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

  • Hong Chao
  • Chun-Yu Ho
  • Shaoqing Huang
  • Xiangdong Qin
  • Jiajia Cong

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)288-310
Journal / PublicationJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume158
Online published6 Dec 2018
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2019
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We consider a two-stage tournament in which two alliances compete in stage one. Members of the winning alliance then compete against each other in stage two. Members’ investment in stage one could increase their alliance’s winning probability, but could also be appropriated and used against them by their partners-turned-rivals in stage two. This hold-up problem creates a negative incentive for within-alliance cooperation. We test this theoretical benchmark in an experiment. In a second experiment, we investigate whether ex-ante informal agreements deter appropriation. We find that such agreements are honored, and thus encourage investments, only under the fixed matching condition.

© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Research Area(s)

  • Two-stage tournament, Alliance, Hold-up problem, Appropriation, Informal agreement

Citation Format(s)

Partners or Rivals? An Experimental Study of a Two-Stage Tournament. / Chao, Hong; Ho, Chun-Yu; Huang, Shaoqing et al.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 158, 02.2019, p. 288-310.

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review