Partners or Rivals? An Experimental Study of a Two-Stage Tournament
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 288-310 |
Journal / Publication | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
Volume | 158 |
Online published | 6 Dec 2018 |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
We consider a two-stage tournament in which two alliances compete in stage one. Members of the winning alliance then compete against each other in stage two. Members’ investment in stage one could increase their alliance’s winning probability, but could also
be appropriated and used against them by their partners-turned-rivals in stage two. This
hold-up problem creates a negative incentive for within-alliance cooperation. We test this
theoretical benchmark in an experiment. In a second experiment, we investigate whether
ex-ante informal agreements deter appropriation. We find that such agreements are honored, and thus encourage investments, only under the fixed matching condition.
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Research Area(s)
- Two-stage tournament, Alliance, Hold-up problem, Appropriation, Informal agreement
Citation Format(s)
Partners or Rivals? An Experimental Study of a Two-Stage Tournament. / Chao, Hong; Ho, Chun-Yu; Huang, Shaoqing et al.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 158, 02.2019, p. 288-310.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 158, 02.2019, p. 288-310.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review