Abstract
It is prevalent in many markets that customers are provided menus of tariffs with usage-dependent marginal prices. One instance of such a nonlinear pricing scheme is additional payments on excess consumptions (e.g., overage charge, late fee, and add-on charge for ancillary features or services). Conversely, firms may offer loyalty credit for repeated purchases or consumptions (e.g., quantity discount contracts and redemption points or mileage in reward programs). Interestingly, both increasing and diminishing marginal prices may exist across and within markets but not concurrently on a menu. In this paper, we present a new perspective on whether and when firms should penalize or reward extra consumptions. We consider the standard problem of how a monopoly firm may design a menu of tariffs to sequentially screen consumers with multiple-period con-sumptions who are heterogenous in consumption value distribution and demand fre-quency. To relinquish less information rent to the high-type consumers, the optimal design should involve a tariff with increasing (diminishing) marginal price when the demand fre-quency of the high-value consumers is above or sufficiently lower (slightly lower) than that of the low-value consumers. This general pattern continues to hold under alternative settings on consumer heterogeneity and on uncertainty resolution about multiple-unit demand. © 2022 INFORMS.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 614-633 |
| Journal | Marketing Science |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Online published | 13 Sept 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - May 2023 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Research Keywords
- late fee
- loyalty discount
- multipart tariff
- overage charge
- penalty fee
- reward program
- screening