Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods

Yukun Cheng; Xiaotie Deng; Baqiao Quan

doi:10.65109/cyce3424

Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods

Yukun Cheng
, Xiaotie Deng
, Baqiao Quan

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

Abstract

Mechanisms for crowdfunding public goods are essential for ensuring that societies can collectively benefit from public goods. Unlike previous researches on crowdfunding for public goods, which focused on binary outcomes-either full provision or none at all, this paper proposes an auction framework to examine the partial provision of public goods, based on the funds raised, with the goal of maximizing the final investment amount. We develop truthful investment mechanisms that achieve the (approximate) optimal expected investment amount across different models, taking into account the number of agents. © 2025 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org).

Original language	English
Title of host publication	AAMAS '25
Subtitle of host publication	Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Publisher	International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages	2466-2468
Number of pages	3
ISBN (Electronic)	979-8-4007-1426-9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.65109/cyce3424
Publication status	Published - 2025
Externally published	Yes
Event	24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025 - Detroit, United States Duration: 19 May 2025 → 23 May 2025

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
ISSN (Print)	1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)	1558-2914

Conference

Conference	24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025
Place	United States
City	Detroit
Period	19/05/25 → 23/05/25

Funding

The first author is supported by NSFCs (No. 12471339); the second author is supported by Wuhan East Lake High-Tech Development Zone (also known as the Optics Valley of China, or OVC) National Comprehensive Experimental Base for Governance of Intelligent Society; and the third author is supported by the Elite Undergraduate Training Program of School of Mathematical Sciences in Peking University.

Research Keywords

Crowdfunding
Mechanism design
Optimal investment
Public goods
Truthful

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10.65109/cyce3424

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Cheng, Y., Deng, X., & Quan, B. (2025). Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods. In AAMAS '25: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 2466-2468). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). https://doi.org/10.65109/cyce3424

Cheng, Yukun ; Deng, Xiaotie ; Quan, Baqiao. / Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods. AAMAS '25: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2025. pp. 2466-2468 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

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title = "Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods",

abstract = "Mechanisms for crowdfunding public goods are essential for ensuring that societies can collectively benefit from public goods. Unlike previous researches on crowdfunding for public goods, which focused on binary outcomes-either full provision or none at all, this paper proposes an auction framework to examine the partial provision of public goods, based on the funds raised, with the goal of maximizing the final investment amount. We develop truthful investment mechanisms that achieve the (approximate) optimal expected investment amount across different models, taking into account the number of agents. {\textcopyright} 2025 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org).",

keywords = "Crowdfunding, Mechanism design, Optimal investment, Public goods, Truthful",

author = "Yukun Cheng and Xiaotie Deng and Baqiao Quan",

year = "2025",

doi = "10.65109/cyce3424",

language = "English",

series = "Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS",

publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",

pages = "2466--2468",

booktitle = "AAMAS '25",

note = "24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025 ; Conference date: 19-05-2025 Through 23-05-2025",

}

Cheng, Y, Deng, X & Quan, B 2025, Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods. in AAMAS '25: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 2466-2468, 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025, Detroit, United States, 19/05/25. https://doi.org/10.65109/cyce3424

Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods. / Cheng, Yukun; Deng, Xiaotie; Quan, Baqiao.
AAMAS '25: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2025. p. 2466-2468 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods

AU - Cheng, Yukun

AU - Deng, Xiaotie

AU - Quan, Baqiao

PY - 2025

Y1 - 2025

N2 - Mechanisms for crowdfunding public goods are essential for ensuring that societies can collectively benefit from public goods. Unlike previous researches on crowdfunding for public goods, which focused on binary outcomes-either full provision or none at all, this paper proposes an auction framework to examine the partial provision of public goods, based on the funds raised, with the goal of maximizing the final investment amount. We develop truthful investment mechanisms that achieve the (approximate) optimal expected investment amount across different models, taking into account the number of agents. © 2025 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org).

AB - Mechanisms for crowdfunding public goods are essential for ensuring that societies can collectively benefit from public goods. Unlike previous researches on crowdfunding for public goods, which focused on binary outcomes-either full provision or none at all, this paper proposes an auction framework to examine the partial provision of public goods, based on the funds raised, with the goal of maximizing the final investment amount. We develop truthful investment mechanisms that achieve the (approximate) optimal expected investment amount across different models, taking into account the number of agents. © 2025 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org).

KW - Crowdfunding

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Optimal investment

KW - Public goods

KW - Truthful

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105009839909

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105009839909#tab=impact

U2 - 10.65109/cyce3424

DO - 10.65109/cyce3424

M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 2466

EP - 2468

BT - AAMAS '25

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

T2 - 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2025

Y2 - 19 May 2025 through 23 May 2025

ER -

Cheng Y, Deng X, Quan B. Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods. In AAMAS '25: Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2025. p. 2466-2468. (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS). Epub 2025 Jun 5. doi: 10.65109/cyce3424

Optimal Mechanism Design for Crowdfunding of Public Goods

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