Optimal contract under brand name collaboration

Debasmita Basak; Arijit Mukherjee

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2013.11.008

Optimal contract under brand name collaboration

Debasmita Basak
, Arijit Mukherjee

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of fixed-fee and output royalty. We show that the firms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive fixed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers' initial perception about the products of the firms reflected in the consumers' maximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that the possibility of brand name collaboration is significantly more than predicted in the existing literature. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	238-240
Journal	Economic Modelling
Volume	37
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.11.008
Publication status	Published - Feb 2014
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].

Research Keywords

Brand name collaboration
D43
D45
Fixed-fee
Royalty

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abstract = "In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of fixed-fee and output royalty. We show that the firms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive fixed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers' initial perception about the products of the firms reflected in the consumers' maximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that the possibility of brand name collaboration is significantly more than predicted in the existing literature. {\textcopyright} 2013 Elsevier B.V.",

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AU - Mukherjee, Arijit

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N2 - In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of fixed-fee and output royalty. We show that the firms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive fixed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers' initial perception about the products of the firms reflected in the consumers' maximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that the possibility of brand name collaboration is significantly more than predicted in the existing literature. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

AB - In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of fixed-fee and output royalty. We show that the firms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive fixed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers' initial perception about the products of the firms reflected in the consumers' maximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that the possibility of brand name collaboration is significantly more than predicted in the existing literature. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

KW - Brand name collaboration

KW - D43

KW - D45

KW - Fixed-fee

KW - Royalty

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DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.11.008

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0264-9993

VL - 37

SP - 238

EP - 240

JO - Economic Modelling

JF - Economic Modelling

ER -

Optimal contract under brand name collaboration

Abstract

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Research Keywords

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