Abstract
This paper explores how autonomous vehicles (AVs) reshape matching efficiency and market power in ride-hailing. Unlike human drivers, AVs operate under centralized algorithms, decoupling service quality from physical fleet size and creating a "capacity paradox". Using a game-theoretic Hotelling model, we analyze market equilibria under independent competition and strategic partnership regimes. We reveal that AV matching efficiency exerts a non-linear impact on capacity and pricing. In competition, high algorithmic precision paradoxically incentivizes the AV platform to shrink its fleet to minimize capital expenditures. In a partnership, the unified platform leverages pricing to either prevent cannibalization or accelerate consumer migration to AVs, contingent on the human-driven fleet's cost-effectiveness. This study provides novel insights into platform strategy and the welfare implications of autonomous mobility integration.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publication status | Published - 2026 |
| Event | Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems 2026 (PACIS 2026): Leapfrogging the Future with Artificial Intelligence - Pullman Hotel Thamrin CBD, Jakarta, Indonesia Duration: 4 Jul 2026 → 8 Jul 2026 https://pacis2026.aisconferences.org |
Conference
| Conference | Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems 2026 (PACIS 2026) |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | PACIS2026 |
| Place | Indonesia |
| City | Jakarta |
| Period | 4/07/26 → 8/07/26 |
| Internet address |
Bibliographical note
Research Unit(s) information for this publication is provided by the author(s) concerned.Research Keywords
- Autonomous Vehicles
- Ride-hailing Platforms
- Matching Efficiency
- Platform Competition
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