On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 397-402 |
| Journal / Publication | Operations Research Letters |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Online published | 29 Apr 2013 |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2013 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
We consider Stackelberg pricing games between two servers with homogeneous customers. We find that a first-mover advantage holds when the demand is large and that a second-mover advantage exists when the demand is scarce. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Research Area(s)
- First-mover advantage, Price leadership, Queueing, Service competition, Strategic customers
Citation Format(s)
On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition. / Guo, Pengfei; Hassin, Refael.
In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 41, No. 4, 07.2013, p. 397-402.
In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 41, No. 4, 07.2013, p. 397-402.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
