On the advantage of leadership in service pricing competition

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

4 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)397-402
Journal / PublicationOperations Research Letters
Volume41
Issue number4
Online published29 Apr 2013
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2013
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We consider Stackelberg pricing games between two servers with homogeneous customers. We find that a first-mover advantage holds when the demand is large and that a second-mover advantage exists when the demand is scarce. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Research Area(s)

  • First-mover advantage, Price leadership, Queueing, Service competition, Strategic customers