On incentive compatible competitive selection protocols
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 447-462 |
| Journal / Publication | Algorithmica (New York) |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2011 |
Link(s)
Abstract
The problem of selecting m best players out of n candidates, through pairwise comparisons, is considered. Deviating from the standard models, it is assumed in this article that the outcome of a pairwise comparison (e.g., a match between two candidates) may be manipulated by collaborating participants: The stronger party may intentionally lose to the weaker party in order to gain group benefit. We discuss protocol design issues for such scenarios, and develop both possibility and impossibility results. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
Research Area(s)
- Algorithmic mechanism design, Incentive compatible ranking, Incentive compatible selection
Citation Format(s)
On incentive compatible competitive selection protocols. / Chen, Xi; Deng, Xiaotie; Liu, Becky Jie.
In: Algorithmica (New York), Vol. 61, No. 2, 10.2011, p. 447-462.
In: Algorithmica (New York), Vol. 61, No. 2, 10.2011, p. 447-462.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
