Networked Evolutionary Games With Intergroup Conflict: Modeling and Collective Interest Analysis

Resource competition and intentional disruptions, grounded in rational intergroup conflict theory, play a central role in driving strategic rivalry in networked games. These mechanisms mirror real-world conflict dynamics, profoundly shaping decision-making processes and interfering with systemic stability. This study investigates the modeling and dynamics of networked evolutionary games with intergroup conflict (NEGs-IC). In the proposed framework, players are assigned a finite number of health points, which decrease when attacked-affecting both survivability and strategic interactions. Leveraging logical dynamical system modeling, we capture the co-evolution of strategies, payoffs, health points, and player actions, demonstrating that NEGs-IC can be effectively represented as a logical dynamic system. To characterize collective interest in NEGs-IC, we introduce an objective function that balances group cooperation and health point attrition. Based on this formulation, we define three evaluation criteria-optimal, suboptimal, and weak-to assess collective interest. An illustrative example is also presented to analyze network-based conflicts, offering insights into strategic behavior in adversarial environments. © 2025 IEEE.