TY - GEN
T1 - Multi-Fleet Platoon Matching
T2 - 21st IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC 2018)
AU - Johansson, Alexander
AU - Nekouei, Ehsan
AU - Johansson, Karl Henrik
AU - MÃ¥rtensson, Jonas
PY - 2018/11
Y1 - 2018/11
N2 - We consider the platoon matching problem for a set of trucks with the same origin, but different destinations. It is assumed that the vehicles benefit from traveling in a platoon for instance through reduced fuel consumption. The vehicles belong to different fleet owners and their strategic interaction is modeled as a non-cooperative game where the vehicle actions are their departure times. Each truck has a preferred departure time and its utility function is defined as the difference between its benefit from platooning and the cost of deviating from its preferred departure time. We show that the platoon matching game is an exact potential game. An algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed for finding a Nash equilibrium of the game. At a Nash equilibrium, vehicles with the same departure time are matched to form a platoon. Finally, the total fuel reduction at the Nash equilibrium is studied and compared with that of a cooperative matching solution where a common utility function for all vehicles is optimized.
AB - We consider the platoon matching problem for a set of trucks with the same origin, but different destinations. It is assumed that the vehicles benefit from traveling in a platoon for instance through reduced fuel consumption. The vehicles belong to different fleet owners and their strategic interaction is modeled as a non-cooperative game where the vehicle actions are their departure times. Each truck has a preferred departure time and its utility function is defined as the difference between its benefit from platooning and the cost of deviating from its preferred departure time. We show that the platoon matching game is an exact potential game. An algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed for finding a Nash equilibrium of the game. At a Nash equilibrium, vehicles with the same departure time are matched to form a platoon. Finally, the total fuel reduction at the Nash equilibrium is studied and compared with that of a cooperative matching solution where a common utility function for all vehicles is optimized.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85060477254&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85060477254&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.1109/ITSC.2018.8569379
DO - 10.1109/ITSC.2018.8569379
M3 - 32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)
SN - 9781728103235
SN - 9781728103211
T3 - IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Proceedings, ITSC
SP - 2980
EP - 2985
BT - 2018 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference, ITSC '18
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 4 November 2018 through 7 November 2018
ER -