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More Simplicity for Trainers, More Opportunity for Attackers: Black-Box Attacks on Speaker Recognition Systems by Inferring Feature Extractor

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

Abstract

Recent studies have revealed that deep learning-based speaker recognition systems (SRSs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples (AEs). However, the practicality of existing black-box AE attacks is restricted by the requirement for extensive querying of the target system or the limited attack success rates (ASR). In this paper, we introduce VoxCloak, a new targeted AE attack with superior performance in both these aspects. Distinct from existing methods that optimize AEs by querying the target model, VoxCloak initially employs a small number of queries (e.g., a few hundred) to infer the feature extractor used by the target system. It then utilizes this feature extractor to generate any number of AEs locally without the need for further queries. We evaluate VoxCloak on four commercial speaker recognition (SR) APIs and seven voice assistants. On the SR APIs, VoxCloak surpasses the existing transfer-based attacks, improving ASR by 76.25% and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) by 13.46 dB, as well as the decision-based attacks, requiring 33 times fewer queries and improving SNR by 7.87 dB while achieving comparable ASRs. On the voice assistants, VoxCloak outperforms the existing methods with a 49.40% improvement in ASR and a 15.79 dB improvement in SNR. © USENIX Security Symposium 2024. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages2973-2990
ISBN (Print)9781939133441
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2024
Event33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security '24) - Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Philadelphia, United States
Duration: 14 Aug 2024 → 16 Aug 2024
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24

Publication series

NameProceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium

Conference

Conference33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security '24)
PlaceUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period14/08/24 → 16/08/24
Internet address

Funding

We thank the anonymous reviewers and our shepherd for their helpful and valuable feedback. This work was partially supported by the NSFC under Grants U20B2049, U21B2018, 62302344, 62132011, 62161160337, 62376210, 62006181, and U20A20177, HK RGC under Grants R6021-20F and N_CityU139/21, Shaanxi Province Key Industry Innovation Program 2023-ZDLGY-38 and 2021ZDLGY01-02, and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under grant xtr052023004 and xtr022019002.

RGC Funding Information

  • RGC-funded

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