Monotone properties of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)peer-review

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Author(s)

  • Aries Wei SUN

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics
Subtitle of host publicationThird International Workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer
Pages570-575
VolumeLNCS 4858
ISBN (Print)9783540771043
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
VolumeLNCS 4858
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Conference

Title3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007
PlaceUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period12 - 14 December 2007

Abstract

In this paper, we give the definition of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions. Then we define three monotone properties of such auctions and study the implication relationships among them. This paper extends our previous work [4] which was focused on deterministic symmetric incentive compatible auctions.

Citation Format(s)

Monotone properties of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions. / SUN, Aries Wei.

Internet and Network Economics: Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings. Vol. LNCS 4858 Springer, 2007. p. 570-575 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. LNCS 4858 ).

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works (RGC: 12, 32, 41, 45)32_Refereed conference paper (with ISBN/ISSN)peer-review