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Monotone properties of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions

  • Aries Wei SUN

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we give the definition of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions. Then we define three monotone properties of such auctions and study the implication relationships among them. This paper extends our previous work [4] which was focused on deterministic symmetric incentive compatible auctions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics
Subtitle of host publicationThird International Workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer 
Pages570-575
VolumeLNCS 4858
ISBN (Print)9783540771043
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007
Event3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: 12 Dec 200714 Dec 2007

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
VolumeLNCS 4858
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Conference

Conference3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007
PlaceUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period12/12/0714/12/07

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