Abstract
The present paper directly tests Kerr’ (1975) s proposal by investigating whether, how and why highly visible behaviors are over-rewarded and less visible, but similarly (or more) important behaviors are under-rewarded. Findings from three studies demonstrated that scorers were rewarded with higher salaries and received more support in the NBA All-Star balloting than defenders, even though they might not necessarily make more contribution than their teammates.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Academy of Management Proceedings |
| Publisher | Academy of Management |
| Volume | 2008 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2008 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 2008 Academy of Management Annual Meeting - Anaheim, United States Duration: 8 Aug 2008 → 13 Aug 2008 Conference number: 68th https://pd.aom.org/2008/subMenu.asp?mode=setmenu&menuid=14 https://pd.aom.org/2008/pdf/AOM_2008_Annual_Meeting_Program.pdf https://pd.aom.org/2008/pdf/2008ProgramAddenda.pdf |
Conference
| Conference | 2008 Academy of Management Annual Meeting |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | AOM 2008 |
| Place | United States |
| City | Anaheim |
| Period | 8/08/08 → 13/08/08 |
| Internet address |
Research Keywords
- Compensation
- Judgment and decision making
- Vividness