Abstract
This paper formulates a game theory model to discuss equilibrium among four main participants who need to choose between acting sunshine and shadow activities in financial market. Their activities will determine the market's transparency level and indirectly decide utility of each player. We observe that the perfect situation, when all players act sunshine activities, is Nash equilibrium. But when financial institutions, regulators and intermediaries choose to coalesce together and deviate from the rules, a Pareto improvement will take place in the allied group, and the equilibrium will move. But when market transparency decreases to too low a level and goes below the bottom line, investors will leave the market and the bubble will burst. © 2010 IEEE.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings - 3rd International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering, BIFE 2010 |
| Pages | 256-260 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
| Event | 3rd International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering, BIFE 2010 - Hong Kong, China Duration: 13 Aug 2010 → 15 Aug 2010 |
Conference
| Conference | 3rd International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering, BIFE 2010 |
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| Place | China |
| City | Hong Kong |
| Period | 13/08/10 → 15/08/10 |