Managing for Legitimacy : Agency Governance in Its "Deep" Constitutional Context

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal

2 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

  • Muiris Maccarthaigh
  • Martin Painter
  • Wai-Hang Yee

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)496-506
Journal / PublicationPublic Administration Review
Volume76
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2016

Abstract

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive's governing legitimacy. Inspired by Charles Tilly (1984), the authors compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular, configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies, the elected government of Ireland's parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e., democratic) legitimacy, while the executive government of Hong Kong's administrative state favors output (i.e., performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.

Citation Format(s)

Managing for Legitimacy : Agency Governance in Its "Deep" Constitutional Context. / Maccarthaigh, Muiris; Painter, Martin; Yee, Wai-Hang.

In: Public Administration Review, Vol. 76, No. 3, 01.05.2016, p. 496-506.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journal