Managerial style in cost asymmetry and shareholder value

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)800-826
Number of pages27
Journal / PublicationManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume41
Issue number5
Online published28 Jan 2020
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2020
Externally publishedYes

Link(s)

DOI

DOI
Check@CityULib
Link to Scopus https://www.scopus.com/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85078669011&origin=recordpage
Permanent Link https://scholars.cityu.edu.hk/en/publications/publication(9a535cb3-9f35-4874-b250-b44860ea37e5).html

Abstract

We show that CEOs' contribution to SG&A cost asymmetry is associated with lower shareholder value. CEO-related excess SG&A cost stickiness of CEOs with compensation less tied to shareholder value creation and high power drive this association. Last, we provide first evidence that cost asymmetry incorporates a harmful element to the firm and shareholders, namely CEO-related excess SG&A cost asymmetry.

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Publication fingerprints text

100
asymmetry INIS
100
values INIS
100
cost INIS
100
Shared Value Keyphrases
100
Managerial Style Keyphrases
100
Cost Asymmetry Keyphrases
100
Cost Economics, Econometrics a...
100
Shareholder Value Economics, Econometrics a...
25
Shareholders Keyphrases
25
Cost Stickiness Keyphrases
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Citation Format(s)

[ RIS ] [ BibTeX ]
Managerial style in cost asymmetry and shareholder value. / Lopatta, Kerstin; Kaspereit, Thomas; Gastone, Laura-Maria.
In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 41, No. 5, 07.2020, p. 800-826.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review