Managerial myopia and corporate financialization: Evidence from China

Cheng Zhang, Cheng Liu, Yaoying Ma*, Chunhong Yang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

While managerial characteristics significantly impact corporate strategies, the role of managerial myopia in corporate financialization remains underexplored. Using data from a sample of 20,881 firm-year observations of Chinese firms from 2007 to 2019, we examine how managerial myopia influences corporate financialization. We find that managerial myopia promotes corporate financialization. The results are robust to various measures of financialization, alternative specifications, and considerations of endogeneity. Further analysis reveals that external supervision, indicated by analyst attention and institutional investor shareholdings, mitigates the positive effect of managerial myopia on corporate financialization. By contrast, corporate pressures, such as default risk and competitive pressure, amplify the tendency toward financialization. © 2024 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)184-214
JournalJournal of International Financial Management and Accounting
Volume36
Issue number1
Online published25 Sept 2024
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2025

Research Keywords

  • analyst attention
  • distance to default
  • financialization
  • institutional investors
  • managerial myopia

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