TY - GEN
T1 - Make a difference
T2 - 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2017
AU - Cheung, Man Hon
AU - Hou, Fen
AU - Huang, Jianwei
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - In a mobile crowdsensing (MCS) application, user diversity and social effect are two important phenomena that determine its profitability, where the former improves the sensing quality, while the latter incentives the users' participation. In this paper, we consider a reward mechanism design for the service provider to achieve diversity in the collected data by exploiting the users' social relationship. Specifically, we formulate a two-stage decision problem, where the service provider first optimizes its rewards for profit maximization. The users then decide their effort levels through social network interactions as a participation game. The analysis is particularly challenging due to the users' interplay in both the diversity and social graphs, which leads to a non-convex bilevel optimization problem. Surprisingly, we find that the service provider can focus on one superimposed graph that incorporates the diversity and social relationship and compute the optimal reward as the Katz centrality in closed-form. Simulation results, based on the random graph and a real Facebook trace, show that the availability of network information improves both the service provider's profit and the users' social surplus over the incomplete information cases.
AB - In a mobile crowdsensing (MCS) application, user diversity and social effect are two important phenomena that determine its profitability, where the former improves the sensing quality, while the latter incentives the users' participation. In this paper, we consider a reward mechanism design for the service provider to achieve diversity in the collected data by exploiting the users' social relationship. Specifically, we formulate a two-stage decision problem, where the service provider first optimizes its rewards for profit maximization. The users then decide their effort levels through social network interactions as a participation game. The analysis is particularly challenging due to the users' interplay in both the diversity and social graphs, which leads to a non-convex bilevel optimization problem. Surprisingly, we find that the service provider can focus on one superimposed graph that incorporates the diversity and social relationship and compute the optimal reward as the Katz centrality in closed-form. Simulation results, based on the random graph and a real Facebook trace, show that the availability of network information improves both the service provider's profit and the users' social surplus over the incomplete information cases.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85034115694&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85034115694&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8057035
DO - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8057035
M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)
SN - 978-1-5090-5337-7
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
BT - IEEE INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PB - IEEE
Y2 - 1 May 2017 through 4 May 2017
ER -