Abstract
We analyze the behavior of a large number of strategic drivers traveling over an urban traffic network using the mean-field game framework. We assume an incentive mechanism for congestion mitigation under which each driver selecting a particular route is charged a tax penalty that is affine in the logarithm of the number of agents selecting the same route. We show that the mean-field approximation of such a large-population dynamic game leads to the so-called linearly solvable Markov decision process, implying that an open-loop ∈-Nash equilibrium of the original game can be found simply by solving a finite-dimensional linear system.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2018 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton) |
| Publisher | IEEE |
| Pages | 283-289 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781538665961 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2018 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton 2018) - Monticello, United States Duration: 2 Oct 2018 → 5 Oct 2018 |
Publication series
| Name | Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton |
|---|
Conference
| Conference | 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton 2018) |
|---|---|
| Place | United States |
| City | Monticello |
| Period | 2/10/18 → 5/10/18 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities
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