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Linearly Solvable Mean-Field Road Traffic Games

Takashi Tanaka, Ehsan Nekouei, Karl Henrik Johansson

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review

Abstract

We analyze the behavior of a large number of strategic drivers traveling over an urban traffic network using the mean-field game framework. We assume an incentive mechanism for congestion mitigation under which each driver selecting a particular route is charged a tax penalty that is affine in the logarithm of the number of agents selecting the same route. We show that the mean-field approximation of such a large-population dynamic game leads to the so-called linearly solvable Markov decision process, implying that an open-loop -Nash equilibrium of the original game can be found simply by solving a finite-dimensional linear system.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2018 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)
PublisherIEEE
Pages283-289
ISBN (Print)9781538665961
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2018
Externally publishedYes
Event56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton 2018) - Monticello, United States
Duration: 2 Oct 20185 Oct 2018

Publication series

NameAnnual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton

Conference

Conference56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton 2018)
PlaceUnited States
CityMonticello
Period2/10/185/10/18

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 11 - Sustainable Cities and Communities
    SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities

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