Is Accountability Less in New Democracies Than Under Authoritarian Rule? Lessons in Executive-Legislative Relations in Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia

Fish and Kroenig (2009) argue that “overarching institutional designs” (ie., presidential, parliamentary, and dual systems) tell us less about the prospects of a new democracy than does the particular strength of the legislature. Specifically, executives are best checked where legislatures are powerful, generating horizontal accountability. In addition, ordinary citizens are better informed by the robust party systems that strong legislatures support, fostering vertical accountability. In comparing Freedom House scores with their Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI), Fish and Kroenig show clear correlations, leading them to conclude that democracies are made strong by legislatures that are empowered. This paper tests this thesis in three country cases in Southeast Asia: the Philippines and Indonesia, both new democracies, and Malaysia, a case of electoral authoritarianism. It demonstrates that in the new democracies, though their legislatures may be rated as powerful, members are geared less to checking the executive than to sharing in state patronage. It shows too that under electoral authoritarianism, though the legislature is evaluated as weak, its features an opposition which, with little access to patronage, remains committed to exposing executive abuses. What is more, with the executive operating a regime type that denies him the full legitimacy that can be gained through general elections, he grows more receptive to at least mild legislative scrutiny. Contrary to Fish and Kroenig, then, this paper concludes that the executive is better held accountable by legislatures under electoral authoritarianism than in new democracies. But sooner than leading to any transition, this accountability strengthens authoritarian rule.