International trade in genetically modified products

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

11 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

  • E. Kwan Choi

Related Research Unit(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)383-391
Journal / PublicationInternational Review of Economics and Finance
Volume19
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates competition between two markets that sell close substitutes: a traditional product and a genetically modified (GM) product. Tightening an import quota on the GM product raises the prices of both goods and hurts consumers. Two scenarios are considered under free trade: Cournot-Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. A Stackelberg type monopolist produces more, and the competitive traditional firms produce less, than in Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In the long run, an import ban on the GM product does not help competitive producers of the genetically modified organism (GMO)-free products but benefits only the landowners in Europe. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Research Area(s)

  • Genetically modified products, Import ban, Landowners