Abstract
We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent policies in a noncooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, "Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the South?" We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1635-1653 |
| Journal | American Economic Review |
| Volume | 94 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2004 |
Bibliographical note
Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].Funding
The authors thank Douglas Bernheim, Elhanan Helpman, Robert Lucas, Jr., Giovanni Maggi, Keith Maskus, Lars Svensson, and four anonymous referees for useful suggestions and comments. They are grateful to the U.S. National Science Foundation (Grants SES 9904480 and SES 0211748), the Hong Kong Research Grant Council (Projects CityU 1145/99H and CityU 1235/00H), and the Department of Economics and Finance at City University of Hong Kong for financial support.
RGC Funding Information
- RGC-funded
Policy Impact
- Cited in Policy Documents
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'International protection of intellectual property'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver