Information leakage and supply chain contracts

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

11 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Article number101994
Journal / PublicationOmega (United Kingdom)
Volume90
Online published15 Nov 2018
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

Abstract

This paper investigates information leakage under different contract configurations in a supply chain. We consider two competing retailers, one of whom (incumbent) has private information about market demand while the other (entrant) has no access to acquire any market demand information. We assume that the supplier is the leader who may choose a wholesale price contract (WPC) or a revenue-sharing contract (RSC) with each retailer independently. We explore the effect of the supplier's and incumbent's incentives on non-leakage equilibrium and find out that there exists a non-leakage equilibrium only when the incumbent signs an RSC with the supplier under an appropriately given revenue-sharing rate in situations of high demand variation.

Research Area(s)

  • Contract mechanisms, Game theory, Information leakage, Supply chain management

Citation Format(s)

Information leakage and supply chain contracts. / Liu, Hao; Jiang, Wei; Feng, Gengzhong; Chin, Kwai-Sang.

In: Omega (United Kingdom), Vol. 90, 101994, 01.2020.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review