Information acquisition and voluntary disclosure with supply chain and capital market interaction

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

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Original languageEnglish
Journal / PublicationEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Online published14 May 2021
Publication statusOnline published - 14 May 2021

Abstract

We investigate a firm's information acquisition and voluntary disclosure decisions regarding demand forecast information. We study the interaction among the firm, its supplier, and the external capital market investors who assess the firm's interim equity price. We first analyze when it is beneficial for the firm to acquire demand forecast information, and if such information is acquired, when the firm should disclose it to the supplier and investors. Then, we investigate how the firm's information acquisition and disclosure decisions influence the investors’ and the supplier's pricing strategies. We show that the optimal information disclosure policy for the firm is highly dependent on the corporate myopia level (CML): when the CML is low, the firm discloses low demand information only; when the CML is medium, the firm always withholds demand information; and when the CML is high, the firm discloses high demand information only. Our findings provide a novel plausible explanation to firms’ non-disclosure behaviors commonly observed in practice and highlight the importance of considering the interaction between the supply chain and the capital market.

Research Area(s)

  • Capital market interaction, Game theory, Information acquisition, Supply chain management, Voluntary disclosure