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Influence behaviors and employees' reactions: An empirical test among six societies based on a transactional-relational contract model

  • Melody P.M. Chong
  • , Miriam Muethel
  • , Malika Richards
  • , Ping Ping Fu
  • , Tai-Kuang Peng
  • , Yu Fan Shang
  • , Miguel P. Caldas

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

Abstract

Organizational and task commitment are central drivers of firm performance as they affect employees' willingness to exert effort for the organization. This paper argues that supervisors who consistently use socio-emotional and supportive influence strategies are likely to enhance subordinates' immediate commitment to the tasks as well as their psychological attachment to the organization. Drawing on the transactional-relational contracts framework, we develop and empirically examine the effects of supervisors' influence behaviors on two types of commitment. Data collected from 1150 respondents from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Germany, United States and Brazil provided support for the positive relationship between the persuasive influence strategy and both immediate task and organizational commitment. Exploratory analyses of the cultural differences in our sample reveal differences in assertive and relationship-based individual tactics. We thus identified potentially universally endorsed as well as culturally contingent influence tactics in predicting the two types of commitment. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)373-384
JournalJournal of World Business
Volume48
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2013

Research Keywords

  • A transactional-relational contracts model
  • Immediate task commitment
  • Influence strategies
  • Influence tactics
  • National culture
  • Organizational commitment

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