Abstract
This paper firstly attempts to analyze the influence of asymmetric information about carbon emission of export enterprises on which carbon tariff is imposed on enterprises' profits by non-cooperative game theory models. The main results are: 1) these enterprises will hide their authentic emission information; 2) the information asymmetry will change the optimal carbon tariff rate, the profit of enterprises, the total carbon dioxide emission quantity and the market price of both sides. Based on the above results, some policy suggestions are made.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3103-3111 |
| Journal | Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 12 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2013 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 13 Climate Action
Research Keywords
- Asymmetric information
- Border tax adjustment
- Carbon emission
- Carbon tariff
- Game theory
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