How do firm linkages with government reduce intensity of government corruption?

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAcademy of Management 2008 Annual Meeting: The Questions We Ask, AOM 2008
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

Conference

Title2008 Academy of Management Annual Meeting (AOM 2008)
PlaceUnited States
CityAnaheim, CA
Period8 - 13 August 2008

Abstract

This study explores the relationship between network linkages and the intensity of government corruption. Based on resource dependence theory and institutional theory, we argue that linkages with government could enhance firm¡s legitimacy and reduce the environment uncertainty, thereby avoiding potential government corruption problems. We specify three types of linkages with government (governments as founders, shareholders, and clients) to test our theory. The empirical findings from a database of 1,034 firms in 23 emerging countries indicate that firms founded by governments and serving governments will have less government corruption problems.

Research Area(s)

  • Government corruption, Institutional theor, Resource dependency

Citation Format(s)

How do firm linkages with government reduce intensity of government corruption? / Weng, David H.
Academy of Management 2008 Annual Meeting: The Questions We Ask, AOM 2008. 2008.

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary WorksRGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)peer-review