How do auditors perceive CEO's risk-taking incentives?

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

30 Scopus Citations
View graph of relations

Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1157-1181
Journal / PublicationAccounting and Finance
Volume54
Issue number4
Online published6 Sep 2013
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2014
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock-return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going-concern audit opinions (GCO).

Research Area(s)

  • Audit risk, Compensation incentives

Citation Format(s)

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk-taking incentives? / Fargher, Neil; Jiang, Alicia; Yu, Yangxin.

In: Accounting and Finance, Vol. 54, No. 4, 12.2014, p. 1157-1181.

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review