How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion

Audrey Hu

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041

How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion

Audrey Hu^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller's optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	29-31
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	113
Issue number	1
Online published	12 Jun 2011
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041
Publication status	Published - Oct 2011
Externally published	Yes

Research Keywords

Bidder number
First-price auction
Independent private value
Reserve price
Risk aversion

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041

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title = "How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion",

abstract = "This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller's optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.",

keywords = "Bidder number, First-price auction, Independent private value, Reserve price, Risk aversion",

author = "Audrey Hu",

year = "2011",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041",

language = "English",

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AU - Hu, Audrey

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KW - Bidder number

KW - First-price auction

KW - Independent private value

KW - Reserve price

KW - Risk aversion

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UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-79959920896&origin=recordpage

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 113

SP - 29

EP - 31

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

ER -

How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion

Abstract

Research Keywords

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