Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication

Xiaonan Zhang; Pei Huang; Linke Guo; Yuguang Fang

doi:10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114

Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication

Xiaonan Zhang, Pei Huang, Linke Guo, Yuguang Fang

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The exponentially increasing number of heterogeneous Internet of Things (IoT) devices result in severe spectrum shortage and interference in the already crowded ISM band. Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) is dedicated to achieving direct communication among wireless devices with different radios and modulation schemes, which serves as an effective approach to address the above challenges. Nevertheless, CTC also provides opportunities for adversaries to manipulate IoT devices. In this paper, we identify a new attack. Built on CTC, WiFi devices are able to hide the pre-intercepted ZigBee message into their transmitted waveforms, achieving the objective of directly controlling ZigBee devices. To defend against the attack, we analyze possible strategies and consider constellation higher-order statistic analysis as the countermeasure. Extensive simulations and experiments with commodity devices (CC26x2R1) and USRP-based prototypes show the existence of the newly identified attack, and further, validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive approach.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019)
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	1117-1126
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-7281-2519-0
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114
Publication status	Published - 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019) - Richardson, United States Duration: 7 Jul 2019 → 9 Jul 2019 https://theory.utdallas.edu/ICDCS2019/index.html

Publication series

Name	Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Volume	2019-July

Conference

Conference	39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019)
Abbreviated title	ICDCS 2019
Place	United States
City	Richardson
Period	7/07/19 → 9/07/19
Internet address	https://theory.utdallas.edu/ICDCS2019/index.html

Research Keywords

Cross-Technology Communication
Emulation Attack
IoT
Physical-Layer Defense

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10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114

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Zhang, X., Huang, P., Guo, L., & Fang, Y. (2019). Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication. In Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019) (pp. 1117-1126). Article 8885342 (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems; Vol. 2019-July). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114

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title = "Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication",

abstract = "The exponentially increasing number of heterogeneous Internet of Things (IoT) devices result in severe spectrum shortage and interference in the already crowded ISM band. Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) is dedicated to achieving direct communication among wireless devices with different radios and modulation schemes, which serves as an effective approach to address the above challenges. Nevertheless, CTC also provides opportunities for adversaries to manipulate IoT devices. In this paper, we identify a new attack. Built on CTC, WiFi devices are able to hide the pre-intercepted ZigBee message into their transmitted waveforms, achieving the objective of directly controlling ZigBee devices. To defend against the attack, we analyze possible strategies and consider constellation higher-order statistic analysis as the countermeasure. Extensive simulations and experiments with commodity devices (CC26x2R1) and USRP-based prototypes show the existence of the newly identified attack, and further, validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive approach.",

keywords = "Cross-Technology Communication, Emulation Attack, IoT, Physical-Layer Defense",

author = "Xiaonan Zhang and Pei Huang and Linke Guo and Yuguang Fang",

year = "2019",

doi = "10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114",

language = "English",

series = "Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems",

publisher = "IEEE",

pages = "1117--1126",

booktitle = "Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019)",

address = "United States",

note = "39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019), ICDCS 2019 ; Conference date: 07-07-2019 Through 09-07-2019",

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}

Zhang, X, Huang, P, Guo, L & Fang, Y 2019, Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication. in Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019)., 8885342, Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, vol. 2019-July, IEEE, pp. 1117-1126, 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019), Richardson, Texas, United States, 7/07/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114

Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication. / Zhang, Xiaonan; Huang, Pei; Guo, Linke et al.
Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019). IEEE, 2019. p. 1117-1126 8885342 (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems; Vol. 2019-July).

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Hide and seek

T2 - 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019)

AU - Zhang, Xiaonan

AU - Huang, Pei

AU - Guo, Linke

AU - Fang, Yuguang

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The exponentially increasing number of heterogeneous Internet of Things (IoT) devices result in severe spectrum shortage and interference in the already crowded ISM band. Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) is dedicated to achieving direct communication among wireless devices with different radios and modulation schemes, which serves as an effective approach to address the above challenges. Nevertheless, CTC also provides opportunities for adversaries to manipulate IoT devices. In this paper, we identify a new attack. Built on CTC, WiFi devices are able to hide the pre-intercepted ZigBee message into their transmitted waveforms, achieving the objective of directly controlling ZigBee devices. To defend against the attack, we analyze possible strategies and consider constellation higher-order statistic analysis as the countermeasure. Extensive simulations and experiments with commodity devices (CC26x2R1) and USRP-based prototypes show the existence of the newly identified attack, and further, validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive approach.

AB - The exponentially increasing number of heterogeneous Internet of Things (IoT) devices result in severe spectrum shortage and interference in the already crowded ISM band. Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) is dedicated to achieving direct communication among wireless devices with different radios and modulation schemes, which serves as an effective approach to address the above challenges. Nevertheless, CTC also provides opportunities for adversaries to manipulate IoT devices. In this paper, we identify a new attack. Built on CTC, WiFi devices are able to hide the pre-intercepted ZigBee message into their transmitted waveforms, achieving the objective of directly controlling ZigBee devices. To defend against the attack, we analyze possible strategies and consider constellation higher-order statistic analysis as the countermeasure. Extensive simulations and experiments with commodity devices (CC26x2R1) and USRP-based prototypes show the existence of the newly identified attack, and further, validate the effectiveness of the proposed defensive approach.

KW - Cross-Technology Communication

KW - Emulation Attack

KW - IoT

KW - Physical-Layer Defense

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M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)

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BT - Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019)

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ER -

Zhang X, Huang P, Guo L, Fang Y. Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication. In Proceedings - 2019 39th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2019). IEEE. 2019. p. 1117-1126. 8885342. (Proceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems). Epub 2019 Oct 31. doi: 10.1109/ICDCS.2019.00114

Hide and seek: Waveform emulation attack and defense in cross-technology communication

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