Abstract
We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92. © 2001 Academic Press.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 415-424 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
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