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Game theory via revealed preferences

Indrajit Ray, Lin Zhou

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92. © 2001 Academic Press.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)415-424
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume37
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001

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