Game-theoretic analysis of China's WTO accession

Eric W. Bond; Stephen Ching; Edwin L.-C. Lai

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0106.2003.00214.x

Game-theoretic analysis of China's WTO accession

Eric W. Bond
, Stephen Ching
, Edwin L.-C. Lai

Department of Economics and Finance

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the determination of split of total surplus among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. The model suggests that it is quite plausible that China's share of surplus is more when MFN is in place.
© 2003 Blackwell Publishers Ltd (a Blackwell Publishing Company)

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	117-125
Journal	Pacific Economic Review
Volume	8
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2003.00214.x
Publication status	Published - Jun 2003

Bibliographical note

Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].

Funding

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the work in this paper by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, China (Project no. CityU 1235/00H).

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals

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RGC-funded

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AB - This paper studies the determination of split of total surplus among the negotiating parties (member countries and the acceding country) in a WTO accession negotiation using a sequential bargaining model. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle on the negotiation outcome. The MFN principle says that any tariff reduction offered by the applicant for accession has to be automatically granted to all existing members. The model suggests that it is quite plausible that China's share of surplus is more when MFN is in place. © 2003 Blackwell Publishers Ltd (a Blackwell Publishing Company)

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DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2003.00214.x

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JO - Pacific Economic Review

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ER -

Game-theoretic analysis of China's WTO accession

Abstract

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Funding

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