Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

35 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-98
Journal / PublicationEconomics Letters
Volume72
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2001
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We develop earlier cross-sectional studies of inflation rates by adding the degree of tax centralization as another explanatory variable. This makes central bank independence perform appreciably better as an explanatory variable. Also, we find that centralized countries have higher inflation. © Elsevier Science B.V.

Research Area(s)

  • Central bank independence, Decentralization, H71, Inflation

Citation Format(s)

Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation. / King, David; Ma, Yue.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 72, No. 1, 07.2001, p. 95-98.

Research output: Journal Publications and ReviewsRGC 21 - Publication in refereed journalpeer-review