Firm performance and the ownership of the largest shareholder

Xiaoyue Chen; Jeong-Bon Kim; Steven Shuye Wang; Xiaodong Xu

doi:10.22495/cocv4i3p11

Firm performance and the ownership of the largest shareholder

Xiaoyue Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim, Steven Shuye Wang, Xiaodong Xu

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the relationship between cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholders and firm performance in Chinese capital market. Using a sample of all listed A-share firms between 2000 and 2003, we find that there are "region effects" with an "M" shape in the relationship between cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder and firm performance. The non-monotonic variations of firm performance associated with changes of the largest shareholdings suggest that there may be an optimal ownership structure existed in listed Chinese firms. We also find that firms under the control of largest state shareholders have poorer performance than that under the control of largest non-state shareholders.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	126-138
Journal	Corporate Ownership and Control
Volume	4
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i3p11
Publication status	Published - 2007
Externally published	Yes

Research Keywords

Corporate governance
Firm performance
Ownership structure
The largest shareholder

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title = "Firm performance and the ownership of the largest shareholder",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Firm performance and the ownership of the largest shareholder

AU - Chen, Xiaoyue

AU - Kim, Jeong-Bon

AU - Wang, Steven Shuye

AU - Xu, Xiaodong

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - We examine the relationship between cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholders and firm performance in Chinese capital market. Using a sample of all listed A-share firms between 2000 and 2003, we find that there are "region effects" with an "M" shape in the relationship between cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder and firm performance. The non-monotonic variations of firm performance associated with changes of the largest shareholdings suggest that there may be an optimal ownership structure existed in listed Chinese firms. We also find that firms under the control of largest state shareholders have poorer performance than that under the control of largest non-state shareholders.

AB - We examine the relationship between cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholders and firm performance in Chinese capital market. Using a sample of all listed A-share firms between 2000 and 2003, we find that there are "region effects" with an "M" shape in the relationship between cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder and firm performance. The non-monotonic variations of firm performance associated with changes of the largest shareholdings suggest that there may be an optimal ownership structure existed in listed Chinese firms. We also find that firms under the control of largest state shareholders have poorer performance than that under the control of largest non-state shareholders.

KW - Corporate governance

KW - Firm performance

KW - Ownership structure

KW - The largest shareholder

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84888634450&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84888634450&origin=recordpage

U2 - 10.22495/cocv4i3p11

DO - 10.22495/cocv4i3p11

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 1727-9232

VL - 4

SP - 126

EP - 138

JO - Corporate Ownership and Control

JF - Corporate Ownership and Control

IS - 3

ER -

Firm performance and the ownership of the largest shareholder

Abstract

Research Keywords

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