TY - GEN
T1 - Fair profit allocation in the spectrum auction using the shapley value
AU - Pan, Miao
AU - Chen, Feng
AU - Yin, Xiaoyan
AU - Fang, Yuguang
N1 - Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - Microeconomics-inspired spectrum auctions can effectively improve the spectrum utilization for wireless networks to satisfy the ever increasing service demands. Considering the spatial reuse, the bidding nodes without mutual interference are grouped as virtual bidders competing for the spectrum bands, which turns a multi-winner spectrum auction into a traditional single-winner auction. To make the participating nodes bid truthfully, strategy-proof auctions are exploited to allocate the vacant spectrum bands. However, how to fairly allocate the profits of the virtual bidder among the winning bidders is still an imperative problem to solve. In this paper, we propose a Shapley Value based profit allocation (SPA) to distribute the profit among the bidding nodes according to their marginal contributions, which are both from helping the virtual bidder to win the auction and from generating the revenue during the auction period. Our simulation and analysis show that SPA can effectively integrate the contributions from the two stages in the spectrum auction and fairly allocate the profit among the winning bidders.
AB - Microeconomics-inspired spectrum auctions can effectively improve the spectrum utilization for wireless networks to satisfy the ever increasing service demands. Considering the spatial reuse, the bidding nodes without mutual interference are grouped as virtual bidders competing for the spectrum bands, which turns a multi-winner spectrum auction into a traditional single-winner auction. To make the participating nodes bid truthfully, strategy-proof auctions are exploited to allocate the vacant spectrum bands. However, how to fairly allocate the profits of the virtual bidder among the winning bidders is still an imperative problem to solve. In this paper, we propose a Shapley Value based profit allocation (SPA) to distribute the profit among the bidding nodes according to their marginal contributions, which are both from helping the virtual bidder to win the auction and from generating the revenue during the auction period. Our simulation and analysis show that SPA can effectively integrate the contributions from the two stages in the spectrum auction and fairly allocate the profit among the winning bidders.
KW - Coalition
KW - Profit allocation
KW - Shapley value
KW - Spectrum auctions
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77951610702&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-77951610702&origin=recordpage
U2 - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425718
DO - 10.1109/GLOCOM.2009.5425718
M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)
SN - 9781424441488
T3 - GLOBECOM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
BT - GLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
T2 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, GLOBECOM 2009
Y2 - 30 November 2009 through 4 December 2009
ER -