Facility Location Games with Externalities

Minming Li; Lili Mei; Yi XU; Guochuan Zhang; Yingchao Zhao

Facility Location Games with Externalities

Minming Li, Lili Mei^*, Yi XU, Guochuan Zhang, Yingchao Zhao

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Facility location games study the scenario where a facility is to be placed based on the reported information from agents. In the society where there are relationships between agents, it is quite natural that one agent’s gain will affect other agents’ gain (either increase for a collaborator or decrease for a competitor). By using externality to represent this type of agent interaction, for the first time we introduce it into the facility location games in this paper. Namely, we study the extension where agents’ utilities will be affected by other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for well known existing mechanisms and also prove strong lower bounds.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Publisher	International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages	1443-1451
Number of pages	9
ISBN (Print)	978-1-4503-6309-9
Publication status	Published - May 2019
Event	18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems: AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada Duration: 13 May 2019 → 17 May 2019 http://aamas2019.encs.concordia.ca/index.html

Conference

Conference	18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Place	Canada
City	Montreal
Period	13/05/19 → 17/05/19
Internet address	http://aamas2019.encs.concordia.ca/index.html

Research Keywords

Externalities
Facility location games
Mechanism design

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https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331856

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@inproceedings{cf0bcbef315a4030b7c0658550e9375c,

title = "Facility Location Games with Externalities",

abstract = "Facility location games study the scenario where a facility is to be placed based on the reported information from agents. In the society where there are relationships between agents, it is quite natural that one agent{\textquoteright}s gain will affect other agents{\textquoteright} gain (either increase for a collaborator or decrease for a competitor). By using externality to represent this type of agent interaction, for the first time we introduce it into the facility location games in this paper. Namely, we study the extension where agents{\textquoteright} utilities will be affected by other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for well known existing mechanisms and also prove strong lower bounds.",

keywords = "Externalities, Facility location games, Mechanism design",

author = "Minming Li and Lili Mei and Yi XU and Guochuan Zhang and Yingchao Zhao",

year = "2019",

month = may,

language = "English",

isbn = "978-1-4503-6309-9",

pages = "1443--1451",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems",

publisher = "International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)",

note = "18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems : AAMAS 2019 ; Conference date: 13-05-2019 Through 17-05-2019",

url = "http://aamas2019.encs.concordia.ca/index.html",

}

Li, M, Mei, L, XU, Y, Zhang, G & Zhao, Y 2019, Facility Location Games with Externalities. in Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 1443-1451, 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, Montreal, Canada, 13/05/19. <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331856>

Facility Location Games with Externalities. / Li, Minming; Mei, Lili; XU, Yi et al.
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2019. p. 1443-1451.

Research output: Chapters, Conference Papers, Creative and Literary Works › RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication) › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Facility Location Games with Externalities

AU - Li, Minming

AU - Mei, Lili

AU - XU, Yi

AU - Zhang, Guochuan

AU - Zhao, Yingchao

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

N2 - Facility location games study the scenario where a facility is to be placed based on the reported information from agents. In the society where there are relationships between agents, it is quite natural that one agent’s gain will affect other agents’ gain (either increase for a collaborator or decrease for a competitor). By using externality to represent this type of agent interaction, for the first time we introduce it into the facility location games in this paper. Namely, we study the extension where agents’ utilities will be affected by other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for well known existing mechanisms and also prove strong lower bounds.

AB - Facility location games study the scenario where a facility is to be placed based on the reported information from agents. In the society where there are relationships between agents, it is quite natural that one agent’s gain will affect other agents’ gain (either increase for a collaborator or decrease for a competitor). By using externality to represent this type of agent interaction, for the first time we introduce it into the facility location games in this paper. Namely, we study the extension where agents’ utilities will be affected by other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for well known existing mechanisms and also prove strong lower bounds.

KW - Externalities

KW - Facility location games

KW - Mechanism design

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UR - https://www.scopus.com/record/pubmetrics.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85076887345&origin=recordpage

M3 - RGC 32 - Refereed conference paper (with host publication)

SN - 978-1-4503-6309-9

SP - 1443

EP - 1451

BT - Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

T2 - 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems

Y2 - 13 May 2019 through 17 May 2019

ER -

Facility Location Games with Externalities

Abstract

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Research Keywords

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