Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)21_Publication in refereed journalpeer-review

2 Scopus Citations
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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)674-681
Journal / PublicationOperations Research Letters
Volume48
Issue number5
Online published24 Jul 2020
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2020
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

We investigate equilibrium queueing strategies in an unobservable M∕M∕n non-preemptive priority queue with homogeneous customers. Arriving customers make decisions by choosing one of the three options: balking, joining the regular queue, or joining the priority queue with an additional fee. We adopt a sequential approach to analyze this two-dimensional queueing game. We first obtain the equilibrium choice between joining the priority or the regular queue given a fixed total joining rate, and then we determine the equilibrium total joining rate.

Research Area(s)

  • Equilibrium analysis, Priority queue, Strategic queueing, Unobservable queue