Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 674-681 |
Journal / Publication | Operations Research Letters |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 5 |
Online published | 24 Jul 2020 |
Publication status | Published - Sep 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
Link(s)
Abstract
We investigate equilibrium queueing strategies in an unobservable M∕M∕n non-preemptive priority queue with homogeneous customers. Arriving customers make decisions by choosing one of the three options: balking, joining the regular queue, or joining the priority queue with an additional fee. We adopt a sequential approach to analyze this two-dimensional queueing game. We first obtain the equilibrium choice between joining the priority or the regular queue given a fixed total joining rate, and then we determine the equilibrium total joining rate.
Research Area(s)
- Equilibrium analysis, Priority queue, Strategic queueing, Unobservable queue
Citation Format(s)
Equilibrium analysis of unobservable M∕M∕n priority queues with balking and homogeneous customers. / Li, Qingying; Guo, Pengfei; Wang, Yulan.
In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 48, No. 5, 09.2020, p. 674-681.Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62) › 21_Publication in refereed journal › peer-review