Discussion of "Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion"

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews (RGC: 21, 22, 62)62_Review of books or of software (or similar publications/items)

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Author(s)

Detail(s)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1403-1410
Journal / PublicationContemporary Accounting Research
Volume33
Issue number4
Online published26 Jul 2016
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Externally publishedYes

Abstract

Evans, Moser, Newman, and Stikeleather (2016) use experiments of a one-shot game to analyze the impact of open versus closed internal reporting on collusive managerial behavior. They interpret their results as inconsistent with economic theory. To better contrast their findings with economic theory and to expand their view of same, we sketch economic models capable of explaining many aspects of their results. We also critique the research design and offer an alternative payoff structure. We then relate their experiments to the seminal research of Berg, Dickhout, and McCabe (1995) on trust and reciprocity. Finally, we provide suggestions for further research.