Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China

Alfred M. WU; Wen Wang

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.02.004

Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China

Alfred M. WU
, Wen Wang

Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review

63 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study is the first attempt to examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization at sub-provincial levels in China. The Chinese central government gives detailed guidelines to local governments on public finance, but, ironically, their expenditure assignment is far from being well-regulated. Differences in fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side are enormous among local governments. Employing a panel dataset of 1995-2006, we provide empirical evidence that transfer dependency negatively affects expenditure decentralization in Chinese local governments. It suggests that intermediate governments, i.e., provincial governments, may have "grabbed" central grants for self-interests. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	176-184
Journal	World Development
Volume	46
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.02.004
Publication status	Published - Jun 2013
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publication details (e.g. title, author(s), publication statuses and dates) are captured on an “AS IS” and “AS AVAILABLE” basis at the time of record harvesting from the data source. Suggestions for further amendments or supplementary information can be sent to [email protected].

Research Keywords

China
Decentralization
Fiscal transfers
Intergovernmental relations
Local government

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abstract = "This study is the first attempt to examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization at sub-provincial levels in China. The Chinese central government gives detailed guidelines to local governments on public finance, but, ironically, their expenditure assignment is far from being well-regulated. Differences in fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side are enormous among local governments. Employing a panel dataset of 1995-2006, we provide empirical evidence that transfer dependency negatively affects expenditure decentralization in Chinese local governments. It suggests that intermediate governments, i.e., provincial governments, may have {"}grabbed{"} central grants for self-interests. {\textcopyright} 2013 Elsevier Ltd.",

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T2 - Evidence from China

AU - WU, Alfred M.

AU - Wang, Wen

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PY - 2013/6

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N2 - This study is the first attempt to examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization at sub-provincial levels in China. The Chinese central government gives detailed guidelines to local governments on public finance, but, ironically, their expenditure assignment is far from being well-regulated. Differences in fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side are enormous among local governments. Employing a panel dataset of 1995-2006, we provide empirical evidence that transfer dependency negatively affects expenditure decentralization in Chinese local governments. It suggests that intermediate governments, i.e., provincial governments, may have "grabbed" central grants for self-interests. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.

AB - This study is the first attempt to examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization at sub-provincial levels in China. The Chinese central government gives detailed guidelines to local governments on public finance, but, ironically, their expenditure assignment is far from being well-regulated. Differences in fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side are enormous among local governments. Employing a panel dataset of 1995-2006, we provide empirical evidence that transfer dependency negatively affects expenditure decentralization in Chinese local governments. It suggests that intermediate governments, i.e., provincial governments, may have "grabbed" central grants for self-interests. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.

KW - China

KW - Decentralization

KW - Fiscal transfers

KW - Intergovernmental relations

KW - Local government

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84876452304

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84876452304#tab=impact

U2 - 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.02.004

DO - 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.02.004

M3 - RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal

SN - 0305-750X

VL - 46

SP - 176

EP - 184

JO - World Development

JF - World Development

ER -

Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Research Keywords

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