Designing tax and subsidy incentives towards a green and reliable electricity market

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Original languageEnglish
Article number117033
Journal / PublicationEnergy
Volume195
Online published29 Jan 2020
Publication statusPublished - 15 Mar 2020

Abstract

Incentive schemes and policies play an important role in reducing carbon emissions from electricity generation. This paper investigates designing tax and subsidy incentives towards a reliable and low emission electricity market, using Australia's National Electricity Market as a case study. In this work, a novel framework is proposed to design interactive tax/subsidy incentives on both emission reduction and resource adequacy in competitive electricity markets as a game model. In our model, market participants decide on their capacity expansion/retirement strategies considering the impact of designed incentive schemes on their long-term operation such that the desired levels of emission reduction and fast response generation are achieved in the network. The simulation results for Australia's electricity market during 2017–2052, indicate the necessity of incentive policies, in spite of the cost reduction trajectory for renewable technologies, to reach the emission intensity reduction above 45% in the market by 2052. In 80% emission intensity reduction scenario, the designed incentive schemes highly encourage the investment on synchronous renewables, +17 GW, storage technologies, +15.7 GW, and transmission lines, +1.6 GW, to support high additional penetration of Variable Renewable Energy, wind and solar, +39 GW, which paves the way to transition to a green and reliable electricity market.

Research Area(s)

  • Electricity market expansion model, Emission and fast response capacity incentive policies, Market power