Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review
Author(s)
Related Research Unit(s)
Detail(s)
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 517-534 |
Journal / Publication | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 109 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - Aug 2013 |
Link(s)
Abstract
This article examines the relation between a borrowing firm's ownership structure and its choice of debt source using a novel data set on corporate ownership, control, and debt structures for 9,831 firms in 20 countries from 2001 to 2010. We find that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant negative impact on the firm's reliance on bank debt financing. In addition, we show that the control-ownership divergence affects other aspects of debt structure including debt maturity and security. Our results indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights may choose public debt financing over bank debt as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from bank monitoring. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
Research Area(s)
- Bank debt, Excess control rights, Ownership structure, Public debt
Citation Format(s)
Corporate ownership structure and the choice between bank debt and public debt. / Lin, Chen; Ma, Yue; Malatesta, Paul et al.
In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2, 08.2013, p. 517-534.
In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2, 08.2013, p. 517-534.
Research output: Journal Publications and Reviews › RGC 21 - Publication in refereed journal › peer-review